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ABSTRACT 
In the last years, there has been a number of accounting scandals recorded. The 
revelation of these scandals led international governments and policy makers to adopt 
and introduce new rules and corporate governance structures in order to mitigate 
corporate fraud. One of these suggestions was the establishment of audit committees 
inside firms, which would be responsible to monitor that accounting policies and 
practices are carried out in a law compliant way and that the financial statements of the 
company present in a valid and accurate way the actual financial position of the 
company.  
The main purpose of this dissertation is to investigate how the characteristics of a firm’s 
audit committee relate to earnings management. The investigation aims at identifying 
if there is any relationship in the Greek market and specifically in Greek listed 
companies. Relative research exists in other markets, such as Nigeria, Jordan, Bahrain 
and Malaysia, while the effects of audit committee characteristics on earnings 
management remains uninvestigated in the Greek market. 
For the purpose of this dissertation, financial data of Greek listed companies was used, 
that is available either from their website or the Amadeus database, version 12/2018. 
The period under analysis was 2014 to 2018. For the estimation of earnings 
management the modified jones model was used since discretionary accruals can serve 
as a proxy. To investigate the relationship between the characteristics of the audit 
committee and earnings management, a multivariate OLS model was used. 
Findings suggest that the ADCSIZE and ADCMEET are positively related with the earning 
management. However, the ADCIND and ADCEXP are negatively associated with the 
earning management as a proxy of discretionary accruals. 
Keywords: Earning management, Internal auditing, Audit Committee. 
Mouratidou Zafeiro 
15/12/2019 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The cases of corporate fraud and scandals in the last decade, revealed the need for 
more effective measures that would identify, expose and monitor the activities of 
corporations. Some economic scandals relating to the alteration of financial 
statements refer to the cases of Worldcom (2002), Enron (2001), Tyco (2002), Nortel 
(2008), Folli Follie (2018) and others. The consequences of accounting scandals are the 
bankruptcy of the firm, the loss of money for investors, the deceiving of shareholders 
and the loss of jobs for employees. As mentioned by Agrawal et al. (2017), lawmakers 
responded to such type of scandals through the adoption of new governance 
structures and the Act, S. O. (2002). Regarding to The National (2019) “Folli Follie’s 
scandal, was facing accusations of misleading finances set off a series of crises at the 
company”. Moreover, according to McCrum (2019), the not deeply convincing 
explanation was that wholesale sales were booked through Hong Kong. At the same 
time, there was another warning sign. The entity was audited by a tiny local firm. 
These scandals were generated through the manipulation of financial statements and 
the information included in it. A common method that company executives use to 
manipulate financial statements is earnings management. Earnings management 
refers to the use of accounting techniques in order to present more stable or inflated 
earnings. Less volatile earnings will create the belief in the stock market that the 
company grows and creates additional value, thus any forecasting models will indicate 
higher value for the company. A higher value of the company will also contribute to a 
higher remuneration for managers. In order to quantify earnings management, 
discretionary accruals are used as a proxy. In fact, as proved in the research of Healy 
& Wahlen (1999) “there is a relationship between accrual accounting procedures and 
managers remuneration and bonus schemes”. 
One of the suggestions of lawmakers, was the establishment of audit committees, that 
would be responsible for the monitoring of the accounting practices and policies used 
by companies for financial reporting purposes. Additionally, audit committees should 
control the validity of the information presented in financial statements and report 
directly to the Chief Financial officer for its findings.  
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One of these suggestions was the establishment of audit committees inside firms, 
which would be responsible to monitor that accounting policies and practices are 
carried out in a law compliant way and that the financial statements of the company 
present in a valid and accurate way the actual financial position of the company.  
The object of this investigation is to recognize if there is any relationship between the 
characteristics of the audit committee and earnings management in the Greek market. 
Audit committee characteristics have an important role in its efficiency and thus, in 
this research the question is whether or not it can contribute to the mitigation of the 
earnings management phenomenon. Relative research exists in other markets such as 
Malaysia, Jordan, Bahrain, New Zealand and India. The characteristics of the audit 
committee in relation to earnings management remains unexplored in the Greek 
market and this research tries to contribute into filling this gap. For the purposes of 
the research and for data sufficiency, 150 listed companies in the Hellenic stock 
market were used for the period of 2014 to 2018. The data used in this analysis was 
taken from the financial report available in their websites, the Hellenic Exchange 
website1 and the Amadeus database, version December of 2018.   
In order to understand if there is any relationship between the characteristics of the 
Audit committee and earnings managements, hypotheses have been developed that 
will be tested in this research. The hypotheses are presented below.  
Hypotheses 1: 
The size of the audit committee is negatively associated with earnings management.  
The purpose of this hypothesis is to test whether bigger audit committees can be more 
efficient into identifying and mitigating earnings management. A negative relationship 
is expected because the addition of more capable members in the committee will 
discourage managers from attempting to use accounting techniques, since the risk to 
expose those techniques is greater.  
Hypotheses 2: 
The independence of the audit committee is negatively related to earnings management. 
                                                             
1 www.athexgroup.gr 
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An independent audit committee, whose members have no relation with Board of 
Director members or management executives will focus on presenting the financial 
condition of the firm more accurately. Thus, it is believed that a strong negative 
relationship between the independence of the audit committee and earnings 
management. 
Hypothesis 3: 
The expertise of the members of the Audit committee is negatively related to earnings 
management. 
The probability of manipulation the financial and accounting reports is depended of 
the level experience that the internal auditors have in their educational background. 
In fact, law 4449/2017, Article 44 of the Greek State, requires that every listed 
company has an audit committee that consists of at least three members. All members 
should have a deep knowledge and understanding of the industry in which the 
company operates and at least one member of the committee should be a certified 
public auditor. Based on this law, it is expected that there will be a negative 
relationship between member’s expertise and earnings management. 
Hypothesis 4:  
The frequency of audit committee meetings is negatively associated with earnings 
management.  
More frequent meetings will assure a better communication between the members 
of the audit committee which will result in better effectiveness and thus the risk for 
financial statement manipulation by the management will be higher. Therefore, a 
negative relationship is also expected in this hypothesis. 
The results of the empirical model give the answer to these hypotheses, which all 
contribute to the answer of the major question which is if the audit committee 
characteristics can play an important role in order to mitigate a company’s aggressive 
earnings management.  
 
 
 
 
10 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW     
 
 Agency theory and information asymmetry 
The agency theory explains the relationship between shareholders, acting as 
principals and company executives, as agents, Kalbers & Fogarty (1998). The 
phenomenon of information asymmetry is the problem that arises between the 
company’s management and its shareholders. The management of the company uses 
this advantage in its favour to generate financial statements with smoother or inflated 
earning, in order either to enhance own compensation or to attract new investors by 
keeping the stock price high. The aforementioned procedure is known as earnings 
management. 
Regarding to Bradbury (1990) proposed that it is very important the role of the audit 
committee in the company with the abilities of internal audit to mitigate the 
information asymmetry between the two parties; however, there are high agency 
costs between shareholders and executives because of the improved quality of 
information that offer to those two parties. 
Moreover, managers can take advantage their positions in the companies and thus 
they will use aggressive earning management for their incentives in order to gain more 
benefits and as a result to hide important information from the shareholders 
(information asymmetry). Therefore, audit committee is the intermediate between 
managers and stockholders and the effectiveness of monitoring has as a result to 
reduce the level of information asymmetry (agency theory) between the directors and 
the shareholders.  
The protection of the shareholder wealth and to mitigate the aggressive earning 
management is one of the most important responsibilities that the audit committee 
has to do; as a system of corporate governance controls, Dellaportas et al. (2005).  
Also, nowadays, the audit committee has a very strong position in company’s 
corporate governance because of the significant role that has; to improve the 
credibility and the transparency of the financial and accounting reports. 
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  Agency problem and ownership structure in Greek listed firms 
Regarding to Demsetz, H., & Lehn, K. (1985) “identified ownership structure as an 
important factor that affects firm valuation and performance”. 
“The Greek legal and corporate environment was characterized by its below average 
protection level of shareholders”, regarding to La Porta et al. (1999).  
Additionally, “during the crisis, firms in which controlling owner-managers owned 
more of the control rights, but fewer cash flow rights, suffered more loss of shares 
values”, according to Lemmon & Lins (2001) . 
“That kind of agency problem leads to lower firm value especially in countries with 
legal environment that does not offer adequate legal protection for shareholders”, 
according to La Porta et al. (2002). 
Finally, Jae-Seung Baek, Jun-Koo Kang, & Kyung Suh Park. (2004) suggest “that firms 
with concentrated ownerships by owner- managers experience larger losses in firm 
value”. 
Regarding to the research of Spanos, L. (2005) opined that “in Greece most of the firms 
are family owned, it would be wise to question the role of separation of ownership 
and control as the reason for the creation of agency problem. The conflicts of interest 
between minority and majority shareholders should be more appropriate for 
addressing the agency problem firm face”. 
According to Antoniadis et al. (2008) suggest that the “Corporate Governance 
mechanisms are held responsible for establishing a sound and strong framework for 
protecting investors and therefore for helping the development of financial markets”. 
 Concept of earning management 
The phenomenon of earning management is more probable to happen when a 
company sometimes cannot meet investors’ expectations and demands or in times of 
crisis the company is trying to show that it can withstand any financial problems that 
may has by manipulated the financial statements, Healy & Wahlen (1999). 
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Regarding to Iturriaga, F. J., & Hoffiman P. S. (2005) earnings management may occur 
therefore of agency problem. Usually managers want to improve their position in the 
company by using unfair means like to influence and manipulate contractual results 
that depend on reported accounting figures. 
 All these actions and decisions of managers for the company have as a result in the 
end to not to burden the managers but any losses or negative impacts will be borne 
by the stakeholders. 
The research of Bergstresser (2006) shows that managers can take advantage their 
positions in the companies and thus they will manipulate accounting reports by 
managing accruals for their incentives in order to gain more benefits and improving 
their positions in the companies.  
According to Cheng,H., & Kallapur,S. (2010) that earnings management leads in two 
different points. Initially, managers take advantage the position that they have in their 
companies and act with an opportunistic behavior to increase the usefulness about 
compensation contracts, debt contracts and the picture of the financial statements 
toward to shareholders (opportunistic earnings management). Then, the second point 
is relating with unexpected events that may occur if managers sign contracts that put 
the company in disadvantage financial positon and this phenomenon is called 
(efficient earnings management). 
 The role of Audit Committee 
Audit committee has a very significant position on a company’s corporate governance 
because it is the only unaffected internal mechanism that the company has in order 
to verify the transparency of its financial figures to its shareholders.   
As it is stated in the Act, S. O. (2002) “all publicly traded companies should have a 
qualified audit committee in order to be listed on a stock exchange. Moreover, 
committee members must have independent outside directors, including a minimum 
of one person as a financial expert”. Therefore, Klein, A. (2002) opined that the 
position of internal audit in corporate governance matters should be improved and 
recognized as an important element in the corporate governance structure by the 
listed companies. 
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Additionally, regarding to the research of Yang, J. S., & Krishnan, J. (2005) suggest that 
“the role of internal audit involves three main elements: assessing and improving risk 
management, assessing the system of internal controls and governance processes in 
the company. These elements include policies and procedures to ensure proper risk 
assessment and compliance with applicable laws and regulations. The main role of 
internal audit in risk management is assessing and monitoring risks that company 
faces and providing recommendations for appropriate risk mitigation controls.” 
 The effectiveness of ACS 
According to Fama, E.F. , & Jensen, M.C. (1983) the position of Audit Committee in the 
company can impact significant the financial reporting credibility and the financial 
statement quality. Audit Committee is important in the company and has many 
responsibilities towards to the company and the shareholders. 
Therefore, Pucheta‐Martínez, M. C., & De Fuentes, C. (2007) in their research mention 
that the internal auditors are the intermediate between managers and stockholders 
and the effectiveness of monitoring has as a result to reduce the level of information 
asymmetry (agency theory) between the directors and the shareholders. 
Moreover, the effective role of the Audit Committee has positive impact to company’s 
creditability and transparency towards the stakeholders and the market that the 
company operates. Furthermore, companies that want to be listed on a stock 
exchange must provide a qualified audit committee to be publicly traded companies.  
According to Li, J., Mangena, M., & Pike, R. (2012) they mention that the members of 
the Audit Committee have to be independent outside directors and must at least one 
person to be a financial expert.  
Additionally, Audit Committee monitors managers in order to detect material 
misstatements and thus to lessen the probability of earnings management in the 
financial statements of Greek companies. Therefore, the internal audit related with 
appropriateness and effectiveness of internal control.  
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 Fraud: lack of internal control 
A company in order to be trustworthy to its shareholders should have a well-organized 
internal audit function. By having a strong reliable system of internal controls, this will 
give the company the opportunity to be more effective on the control of financial 
statements. However, there are listed companies that do not comprehend the 
significant role of audit committees and try to manipulate the financial statements 
process for the purpose to hide significant disclosures from the shareholders or to 
attract new investors.  
Firms with independent audit committees and those whose members are more 
financial experts are significantly less likely to be associated with internal control 
problems, Yang, J. S., & Krishnan, J. (2005). 
Additionally, “the corporate governance framework in Greece developed primarily 
through mandatory legislation, most importantly, the Law 3016/2002. This law allows 
the participation of independent non-executives on boards of Greek listed firms, 
establishment of internal control function, and adoption of internal audit charters. 
Therefore, listed firms are required by law to review regularly their internal control 
system”, TAXHEAVEN (2002)2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
2 TAXHEAVEN. (2002). Law 3016/2002. Retrieved from ΝΟΜΟΣ ΥΠ' ΑΡΙΘ. 3016 Για την εταιρική 
διακυβέρνηση, θέματα μισθολογίου και άλλες διατάξεις.: https://www.taxheaven.gr/law/3016/2002  
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3 DEVELOPMENT OF RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS 
 Audit committee attributes and earnings management 
In this research will be included eight control variables in order to monitor other 
factors that may affect the manipulation of reported earnings or management’s 
incentives to manage reported earnings. Therefore, the next hypotheses are 
developed to exam the association of AC characteristics, namely, AC independence, 
AC size, the frequency of AC meetings, and AC expertise on earnings management 
practices in Greece.  
3.1.1 Size of audit committee (ACS) 
As a matter of fact, regarding to Abbott, L. J., Parker, S., & Peters, G. F. (2004) and Xie, 
B., Davidson III, W. N., & DaDalt, P. J. (2003) “the perfect average of the AC size is 
between 3 and 4 members and at least one independent member has proven 
sufficient knowledge of accounting and auditing and the members of the audit 
committee are anticipated to be conversant with basic financial statements. The audit 
committee should be promoted by an independent non-executive member”. 
Moreover, every company should report to its corporate governance statement, the 
number of the members that have on the audit committee, how many independent 
non-executive has, their educational backgrounds and the number of the meetings 
that took place during the year that happened. Usually, it is observed that companies 
with large audit committee and internal auditors with strong educational background 
have lower possibility of appearance of earnings management in the company’s 
financial statements. 
Furthermore, “a negative significant relationship was found between the size of audit 
committee and earnings management practice” according to the findings Yang, J. S., 
& Krishnan, J. (2005), Lin, J. W., Li, J. F., & Yang, J. S. (2006), Baxter, P., & Cotter, J. 
(2009), Lin, J. W., & Hwang, M. I. (2010) and Fodio, M. I., Ibikunle, J., & Oba, V. C. 
(2013). However, according to the studies of Xie, B., Davidson III, W. N., & DaDalt, P. 
J. (2003), Bédard, J., & Gendron, Y. (2010), Abbott, L. J., Parker, S., & Peters, G. F. 
(2004), Alkdai, H. H., & Hanefah, M. M. (2012) and Soliman, M. M., & Ragab, A. A. 
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(2014) “they found no significant relationship between audit committees’ size and the 
level of earnings management”.  
Despite the contrary findings in the literature reported above, this research suggests 
“a negative association between the size of the AC and earnings management”, Mohd 
Saleh, N., Mohd Iskandar, T., & Mohid Rahmat, M. (2007). 
 H1: The audit committee size is negatively associated with earning management. 
3.1.2 Audit committee independence (ACI) 
Audit Committee is the intermediate between managers and stockholders and the 
effectiveness of monitoring has as a result to reduce the level of information 
asymmetry (agency theory) between the directors and the shareholders.  
Moreover, concerning what was just mentioned before, audit committee reinforce its 
independence from the company' management and act as an intermediate between 
management and shareholders in order to reduce the level of information asymmetry 
between those two parties and increase the assurance and trustworthiness of the 
accounting statements and reporting that have been prepared from the management 
according to Deli, D. N., & Gillan, S. L. (2000). 
In similar manner, Klein, A. (2002) discovered “an important negative association 
between the total number of directors in the audit committee number over the 
participation of independent directors and earnings management practice”.  
According to the research of Lin, J. W., Kang, G., & Roline, A. (2009) they mention “the 
importance of the independence of the AC for effective monitoring of financial 
reporting credibility and the financial statement quality, and requires all AC members 
to be independent”. 
Additionally, companies with fully independent audit committees may have very 
strong organized governance and follow the regulations according to the International 
Financial Reporting Standards. Also, the scope of corporate governance is therefore 
the efficiency and transparency of business operations and the protection of investors, 
shareholders and creditors.  
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Consequently, and despite the contrary findings in the literature reported above, this 
study proposes “a negative association between the independence of the AC and 
earnings management”, Mohd Saleh, N., Mohd Iskandar, T., & Mohid Rahmat, M. 
(2007). 
H2: The audit committee independence is negatively associated with earning 
management. 
3.1.3 Audit committee financial expertise (ACEX) 
According to the opinion of the Act, S. O. (2002) requires “at least one member of the 
audit committee must be a financial expert” with finance-related work and 
educational background.  
Similarly, Xie, B., Davidson III, W. N., & DaDalt, P. J. (2003) state that the main function 
of the audit committee is to evaluate and monitor the financial and accounting figures 
to ensure the reliability of the financial information. Therefore, the educational 
background of the internal auditors in the audit committee has an important role to 
increase the efficiency of the audit committee.  
Bédard, J., & Gendron, Y. (2010) opined that audit committees members that have 
high financial expertise knowledge and background are related with lower levels of 
earnings management therefore, members of the financial expertise will not allow 
management to manipulate the financial statements or to conceal important 
information from the accounts that the board of directors or shareholders must know. 
Regarding to Sharma, V. D., & Kuang, C. (2014) opined that companies have lower 
probability of aggressive earning management and manipulation of financial and 
accounting figures when companies have independent directors with financial 
experience in the audit committees. Accordingly, this study proposes “a negative 
association between the AC expertise and earnings management”, Mohd Saleh, N., 
Mohd Iskandar, T., & Mohid Rahmat, M. (2007). 
 H3: The audit committee expertise is negatively associated with earning 
management. 
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3.1.4 Audit committee Meetings (ACM) 
The role of the audit committee is very important in the operation of the company 
regarding the transparency of the financial statements.  
When an audit committee that has more regularly meetings in the year, the members 
of the audit committee will provide more effective methods regarding the monitoring 
role that they have and they will discuss more important issues in order to detect 
material misstatements and as a result to reduce the probability of earnings 
management in the company’s financial statements, according to Li, J., Mangena, M., 
& Pike, R. (2012). 
However, the literature provides mixed results regarding the relationship between 
audit committee and earning management. According to Abbott, L. J., Park, Y., & 
Parker, S. (2000) “a negative relationship was found between the frequency of audit 
committee meetings and the effectiveness of the role of monitoring the company's 
financial reporting process”. Similarly, Abbott, L. J., Parker, S., & Peters, G. F. (2004) 
found that “when audit committee meets at least four times in the year, there is the 
likelihood the occurrence of an important a negative relation regarding the financial 
reporting restatements”. 
Moreover, the researchers Xie, B., Davidson III, W. N., & DaDalt, P. J. (2003), Abdul 
Rahman, R., & Haneem Mohamed Ali, F. (2006), Lin, J. W., & Hwang, M. I. (2010), 
Metawee (2013) and Soliman, M. M., & Ragab, A. A. (2014) also, found “an important 
negative relationship regarding audit committee meetings and earning management 
practices”. Furthermore, Bédard, J., & Gendron, Y. (2010), Davidson, R., Goodwin‐
Stewart, J., & Kent, P. (2005) and Lin, J. W., Li, J. F., & Yang, J. S. (2006) discovered “no 
significant association between the level of earnings management and audit 
committee meetings”.  
Additionally, this research suggests “a negative relationship between the frequency of 
AC meetings and earnings management”, Mohd Saleh, N., Mohd Iskandar, T., & Mohid 
Rahmat, M. (2007). 
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H4: The frequency of audit committee meetings is negatively associated with earning 
management. 
 Control Variables 
 
This study includes eight variables to control for other factors that influence 
managers’ incentives or to limit the manipulation of reported earnings and accounting 
figures.  
According to the research of Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. G., & Sweeney, A. P. (1995) and 
Bédard, J., & Gendron, Y. (2010) opined that “there is a negative relationship between 
company size and earning management because larger firms are likely to have more 
effective internal control systems and face more scrutiny from the market in order to 
be verified the reliability and transparency of their financial statements”. 
Additionally, the literature provides mixed results on the association between 
leverage and earnings management. Park, Y. W., & Shin, H. H. (2004) and Puat Nelson, 
S., & Devi, S. (2013) reported “a negative association”, but Bédard, J., & Gendron, Y. 
(2010) and Sharma, V. D., & Kuang, C. (2014) reported “a positive association”, while, 
Lin, J. W., Li, J. F., & Yang, J. S. (2006) suggest “no significant association between 
leverage and earnings management”.  
Regarding to Zhou, J., & Elder, R. (2002) and to Chung, H., & Kallapur, S. (2003) they 
suggest in their research that “Big 4 auditors associated with less earnings 
management practices”. Thus, this research presents a negative association between 
the size of audit firm and earnings management among Greek listed companies. 
In addition to the aforementioned variables, we are also examining if there is any 
relationship between working capital management and financial performance. 
Indeed, in the research of Deloof, M. (2003) for Belgian companies, there is evidence 
that the management of working capital can affect a company’s profitability. The 
findings of the research suggest that managers can increase profits by lowering credit 
period and inventory period.   
In another study, Vural, G., , Sökmen, A. G., & Çetenak, E. H.  (2012) find evidence from 
Turkish companies that there is a relationship between working capital management 
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and a firm’s financial performance. They find that companies can increase their 
earnings by reducing the collection period of accounts receivable and the cash 
conversion cycle. In their findings, they also suggest that the leverage of a company 
has a significant negative relationship with firm’s profitability.  
In the same topic, Baños-Caballero, S., García-Teruel, P. J., & Martínez-Solano, P. 
(2014) find that working capital management in low levels contributes positively to 
firm’s financial performance, whilst in high levels, those are associated negatively.  
Based on the findings of the aforementioned research, in this study we quantified 
working capital management using credit period, collection period, inventories 
period, liquidity ratio and leverage. The findings are mainly in agreement with prior 
research. Collection period and inventories period are negatively associated with 
earning management, but they are insignificant. Contrarily, leverage, liquidity and 
credit period are significant. Credit period and liquidity are positively related to 
earning management, while leverage shows a strong negative relationship. Finally, the 
ROA was used as a measure of profitability, but shows no significant relationship with 
earnings management. 
4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
In this chapter, it is observed the methodological approach of the study and the way 
in which the research is carried out. It is tested whether the role of AC in Greek listed 
companies can mitigate the aggressive earning management. Moreover, the survey 
will verify if Greek listed companies with fully independent audit committees may 
have very strong organized governance and follow the regulations according to the 
International Financial Reporting Standards ("IFRS", 2019). The models focus on 
identifying how Audit committee characteristics relate to earnings management by 
following the literature and theoretical framework of this study.  
 Study Sample, Data Collection and Data Analysis 
The sample includes all Greek listed companies for the period from 2014 to 2018 and 
the final number of companies included in the analyses is 150 Greek listed companies.  
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Moreover, the data will be received either from the financial statements of the 
companies’ annual reports that were downloaded from the official website of the 
Greek companies and database, especially Bureau Van Dijk’s Amadeus. The financial 
ratios will be calculated on an excel spreadsheet. For the regressions, Stata and excel 
are going to be used.  
 Model 
According to the above literature review, twelve variables are selected to be examined 
in the present research. The dependent variable is “Discretionary accruals as a proxy 
of earning management”, the four independent variables which are “AC 
independence”, “AC size”, “AC meetings” and “AC financial expertise”.  
In addition, in this research I will include eight control variables in order to monitor 
other factors that may affect the manipulation of accounting reported earnings. The 
eight control variables are: 1. “Company size”, 2. “Company leverage”, 3. “Big-4 audit 
firm”, 4. “Credit Period”, 5. “Inventory Period”, 6. “Collection Period”, 7. “Liquidity 
“and 8. “ROA”. 
EM = β1ADCEXP + β2ADCMEET + β3ADCSIZE + β4ADCIND + β5LEVG
+ β6COSIZE + β7BIG4 + β8InvPer + β9CollPer + β10ROA
+ β11CredPer + β12Liq +  e 
The variables are defined below: 
EM= Earning management 
ADCIND=Audit committee independence 
ADCSIZE= Audit committee size 
ADCMEET= Audit committee meetings 
ADCEXP= Audit committee financial expertize 
COMSIZE= Company size 
LEVG= Company leverage 
BIG4= Audit company 
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InvPer= Inventory Period 
CollPer= Collection Period 
ROA= ROA 
CredPer= Credit Period 
Liq= Liquidity  
e = error term. 
 The Dependent Variable (Earnings Management) 
The Modified Jones Model 1995 is the most famous and the most frequently used 
model to detect discretionary accruals according to the working papers of Dechow, P. 
M., Sloan, R. G., & Sweeney, A. P. (1995), Beneish, M. D. (1998), Bartov, E. et al. (2000). 
Step 1: Modified Jones Model 
1. 
TACCit
A(it−1+1)/2
= a1  
1
A(it−1+t)/2
+ a2  
(𝛥𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡−𝛥𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡)
𝐴(𝑖𝑡−1)/2
+  a3  
PPEit
A(it−1+t)/2
 + εit 
TACCit = Total accruals in year t divided by total assets for firm i in year t-1 
ΔREVit = Change in revenue for firm i between the current year and previous 
ΔRECit = Change in receivables for firm i between the current year and previous year 
PPEit   = gross property, plant and equipment for firm i in the current year (t) 
A (t-1+t)/2 = Total assets average for firm i in year t-1 and current year (t) 
a 1, a2 and a3 = parameters  
εit = Residuals for firm i in year t 
So how does it estimate the alphas a 1, a2 and a3? 
Alphas, coefficients or parameters are estimated by means of ordinary least squares 
regressions (OLS). After it knows what the alphas are, it denotes these as  ?̂?1 , 
?̂?2 and ?̂?3. These are the estimated alphas parameters. 
Step 2:  Calculate the total accruals as follow: 
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2. TACCit =  ΔCAit −  ΔCash − ΔCLit + ΔDCLit − DEPit 
TACCit = Total accruals for firm i in the year t 
ΔCAit =  Change in current assets for firm i in the year t 
ΔCash = Change in cash and cash equivalents in year t 
ΔCLit   = Change in current liabilities for firm i in the year t  
ΔDCLit = Change in short term debt included in current liabilities for firm i in the year t 
DEPit   = Depreciation and amortization for firm i in the year t  
Another method to calculate the total accruals according to the theory of (Hribar, P. 
& Collins, D. W., 2002), “is the difference between of operating income (OI) obtained 
from the income statement and operating cash flows (OCFO) obtained from the 
statement of cash flows”. 
2. 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝑂𝐼𝑖𝑡 −  𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡   
Step 3: Calculate the discretionary accruals 
3. 𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 −  𝑁𝐷𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡  
“The predicted values from equation (1) are non-discretionary accruals (NDAC), and 
the difference between actual total accruals (TAC) and (NDAC) is discretionary accruals 
(DAC)”, according to the theory of Kothari, S. P., Leone, A. J., & Wasley, C. E. (2005). 
 The Independent variables 
ADCMIND symbolizes audit committee independence. According to Van Der Zahn, J. 
W. M., & Tower, G. (2004) audit committee independence is an important feature of 
company’s internal control because it influences the effectiveness of monitoring the 
financial reporting credibility and the financial statement quality and requires all the 
members of AC to be independent. The way that is going to be measured the 
independence of AC, is the number of non-executive members of the AC. 
ADCMSIZE symbolizes audit committee size. According to Menon, K., & Williams, J. D. 
(1994) opined that “an audit committee is not effective if it has less than three 
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members”. Moreover, regarding to the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) “an effective 
AC of listed companies should comprise at least three directors”. Therefore, the 
measure that is going to be used for the size of AC is the number of individuals. 
Regarding the number of the members that it is consisted the AC can lead to a positive 
or negative impact on financial statements. 
ADCMMEET symbolizes audit committee meetings. According to the study of Li, J., 
Mangena, M., & Pike, R. (2012) opined that “an active audit committee that meets 
more frequency during the year, would provide its members with greater 
opportunities for discussing and evaluating the issues that are placed before them 
concerning the company’s financial reporting practices”. Therefore, the meetings will 
be measured by the number of times that audit committee take place over the year. 
ADCMEXP symbolizes the educational and accounting background of the internal 
auditors. According to the Act, S. O. (2002) opined that an audit committee should 
have at least one member with financial and accounting background. Therefore, 
Goodwin, J., & Seow, J. L. (2002) and Al‐Najjar, B. (2011) said that the most portion of 
the AC should be composed of financial experts, so as the AC to consider to be reliable 
for the monitoring that it does in the company’s financial reports. Consequently, the 
number of financial experts will be measured by the number of members with a 
background in accounting or finance education and experience.  
 Measurement of the control variables 
Eight control variables are going to be included in the model, in order to monitor other 
factors that maybe are going to affect the association between the dependent variable 
(Earning management) with the AC characteristics. 
Therefore, in this research the eight control variables are “Credit Period”, “Inventory 
Period”, “Collection Period”, “Liquidity”, “ROA”, “Company size”, “Company 
leverage*”, “Big-4 audit firm**”, “Credit Period”, “Inventory Period”, “Collection 
Period”, “Liquidity “and “ROA”. 
*Company leverage is measured as the DEBT/ EQUITY ratio. 
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**Big-4 audit firm is measured as a dummy variable that equals 1 if the company is 
audited by a Big-4 audit firm or 0 otherwise. 
5 RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION 
 Presentation and analysis of data 
For the analysis of the study, 150 Greek listed companies are selected from the 
Hellenic Stock Exchange with a period of four years, from 2014 to 2018. The 
accounting and financial reports and figures were found from the companies’ websites 
or from the database, Bureau Van Dijk’s Amadeus. 
 Empirical Results 
5.2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
As observed, the mean, the median, the maximum value, the minimum value and the 
standard deviation of the sample are being reported for each of variables. The Big4 
variable is a dummy variable and thus the maximum and minimum value is plus one 
and zero respectively.  
In the table 1, it is observed the descriptive statistical test that is was ran in the STATA 
with the results to show that, the average DACC (earnings management EM) has 
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Mean=1.59, STD=3.99 which indicates the extent to which discretionary accruals for 
the distribution to a considerable extent around the average, Max=64.73 and 
Min=0.021.  
The average percentage of ADCMIND is 79.6% or the average of independent (non-
executive) directors is 2.39 with a minimum figure to be 1 member and a maximum 
figure of members to be 3 independents. 
The statistical mean of ADCSIZE is 3 members with the smallest figure to be 3 members 
and a maximum figure of members to be 4 independents.  
The average number of ADMEET is 3.6 times on the year with a minimum time to meet 
the fiscal year to be 2 times and the maximum one to be 4 times.  
The average portion of ADC members that possess financial and accounting 
knowledge and experience; ADCEXP is 70% or 2.1 members, with smallest figure a 
company that will have a person with accounting experience is to be only 1 member 
or the maximum one to be 3 members. 
At the following, it is observed, in table 1 that the statistical mean of company size 
(COSIZE) is 11.36, and the average of leverage ratio of 150 Greek listed companies is 
0.64. Additionally, the average portion of 150 Greek public firms that are controlled 
by Big-4 audit firms is only 28.33%. Thus, most Greek public firms the 71.69% of them, 
prefer not collaborate with Big-4 companies. 
Then, as far as the inventory period, the statistical mean of days is 18.6, with the 
smallest number to be 0 and the greatest extent of days to be 906. Therefore, Greek 
listed companies usually have 18.6 days to sell their current inventories. So, here we 
have a low average collection period that indicates the Greek listed companies sell 
fast their inventories and they do not have problem in their warehouses with any 
remain unsold inventory. 
Regarding to collection period, the statistical mean of period is 122 days, with a 
statistical minimum number to be 0 and a maximum one to 945. As a consequence, 
the average number of days that Greek listed companies have to collect payments are 
122 days. Thus, we observe that we have a very long period of time that the Greek 
 
 
27 
listed companies do not have time to pay off theirs obligations. For this reason, these 
Greek listed companies that their collected period is more than 60 days, they would 
need to adopt a more aggressive collection policy in order to shorten that time frame.  
According for the credit period, the statistical average is 76, with the smallest number 
be 0 and the greatest extent to be 630 days.  As we observe, the average time period 
is 76 days that indicates a long time period, because a long credit period equates to a 
large investment in receivables.  
However, as we observe, the average collection period is longer than the average 
credit period. Therefore, we understand that Greek listed companies do not receive 
very fast their money from their costumers, but they pay sooner their obligations to 
their suppliers around to 46 days than they collect their money back. Moreover, the 
Greek listed companies sell faster their inventories so their average cash conversion 
cycle (CCC) is 68 days. So, if a company’s cash conversion cycle is extensive, that 
means, the company need more time to create cash. As a consequence, enough Greek 
listed companies for the time period 2014 to 2018 had the potential to have a going 
concern issues. 
In the table 1 “descriptive statistics”, it is observed that the average ROA for Greek 
listed companies is 0.052 or 5.2% with a minimum number of ROA 0.00029 and a 
maximum number of ROA 0.7153. So every dollar that some Greek listed companies’ 
have invested in assets, they generate only 5.2 cents of net income. Moreover, the 
average liquidity of Greek listed companies’ is is 1.71 with a minimum number of 0.18 
and a maximum of 43.5. 
Furthermore, according to the investigation of the Abbott, L. J., Parker, S., & Peters, 
G. F. (2004) and Xie, B., Davidson III, W. N., & DaDalt, P. J. (2003), they suggest that 
the assumption that the perfect statistical mean of the ADC size is among 3 and 4 
people for the committee to function properly. Therefore, based on the above results, 
most Greek listed companies have 3 members so these companies care for the 
properly function of their ACs. Also, a well-organized company will not have a small 
audit team to monitor its financial figures, because it will not be capable of fulling 
effectively its duties. However, according to Jensen, M. C. (1993) and Karamanou, I., 
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& Vafeas, N. (2005) there is a possibility of weak monitoring, if an audit team is too 
big, then there is a high possibility the performance of the internal auditors to decline 
because of the poor coordination and the complexity of the process. For these 
reasons, it is understand that the size of the audit team is an important factor that 
play an important role to affect the degree of presence the earning management. 
5.2.2 Pearson Correlation  
Table 2 Pearson Correlation 
 
 
According to the theory of Ahlgren, P., Jarneving, B., & Rousseau, R. (2003), opined 
that “the coefficient r of the Pearson correlation shows how far away all data points 
are from the line of best fit”. Also, the theory of Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. (2013), 
and Hair, J. F., Black, W. C., Babin, B. J., Anderson, R. E., & Tatham, R. L. (2006), it 
suggests that, if the coefficient r of the Pearson correlation is greater than 0.8, this 
means that the model in this research will have a multicollinearity problem. The 
outcomes of the table 2, present that there are not coefficients higher than the 
boundary 0.8, therefore in this study the correlation between the variables and with 
the dependent variable is moderately low.  
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Figure 1 Correlation between Variables & EM 
 
Table 2 and Figure 1, represent a negative association among “DACC (EM)” with 
“ADCIND” (r=-0.0883), “ADCEXP” (r=-0.0139), “LEVG” (r=-0.1185), “ADCMEET” (r=-
0.0013), “InvPer” (r=-0.0359), “CollPer” (r=-0.0656) and “ROA” (r=-0.0340). Also, there 
is positive association among “DACC (EM)” with “ADCSIZE” (r=0.0561), “COSIZE” 
(r=0.0082), “BIG4” (r=0.0941), “CredPer” (r=0.071), and “Liq” (r=0.0643).  
Moreover, the figure 1 shows, that the coefficient r with the greater association is the 
correlation between EM with LEVG (r=-0.1185) and also, the table 2, shows that the 
coefficient r with the greater association among the variables is between BIG4 with 
CollPer (r=0.2133). So, in this model there is a lack of multicollinearity because model’s 
highest coefficient r is lower than the boundary of 0.8. 
5.2.3 Regression Analysis (OLS) 
Table 3 Linear Regression (OLS) 
 
EM -0,08827 0,056057 -0,00128 -0,01386 0,094116 0,008155 -0,11852 -0,03591 -0,06561 -0,03402 0,071041 0,0643 1 
 
ADCIND ADCSIZE ADCMEET ADCEXP BIG4 COSIZE LEVG InvPer CollPer ROA CredPer Liq EM 
 
Negative Positive Positive Negative Positive Positive Negative Negative Negative Negative Positive Positive 
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Figure 2 P-Values 
 
According to the table 3, it is observed that the number of observations is 600, the R-
squared is 0.1803 that means 18.03% of the variation in earning management is 
explained by the explanatory variables. Also, it is different than zero in all significant 
levels as presented by the p-value of this test. Therefore, the R-squared present the 
possibility of the data to be suitable in the model.  
It is observed that the ADCIND, LEVG, CredPer and Liq are significant in significance 
level of 5%. Moreover, ADCSIZE and BIG4, are significant in significance level of 10%. 
Additionally, as it is noticed, the variables; ADCMEET, ADCEXP, COSIZE, InvPer, CollPer 
and ROA with their respective p values are high so there are seemed to be insignificant 
in all significance levels. Therefore, it is understand that the above variables have no 
impact on the dependent variable EM, so they are statistically insignificant in all 
significant levels. 
The model with the coefficients: 
EM = −0.4658ADCIND + 0.6839ADCSIZE + 0.0733ADCMEET − 0.2742ADCEXP 
+ 0.7088BIG4 + 0.0432COSIZE − 0.0562LEVG − 0.0026InvPer
− 0.0013CollPer − 1.63ROA + 0.0049CredPer + 0.091Liq + εi 
As observed, having a ceteris paribus, this means a percentage change in the audit 
committee independence would cause a reduction of 0.4658% change in the earning 
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management. Additionally, a change in the audit committee size would cause an 
earning management increase of 0.6839%, all other being equal. The same happen to 
audit committee meetings, a change of this variable will cause an earning 
management increase of 0.0733%, if all other variables being equal. Moreover, 
regarding audit committee experience, a change in this variable and everything other 
being equal it would cause a reduction of 0.2742% change in the dependent variable 
EM. A percentage change in the Big4 would cause an earning management positive 
change of 0.7088%, all other being equal. Furthermore, ceteris paribus, a percentage 
change in company size would cause an increase of a 0.0432% change in earning 
management. A percentage change in leverage would cause an earning management 
decrease change 0.0562% and all other being equal the same. Furthermore, the 
Inventory period, Collection periods and ROA are negatives values and, all other being 
equal, will cause a 0.0026%, 0.0013% and 1.63% decrease in the dependent variable. 
On the other side, the Credit period and the liquidity are positives values, and, all other 
being equal, will cause a 0.0049% and 0.091% increase in the dependent variable EM.  
Finally, based on the aforementioned reasons and the output of the model from Stata, 
the two hypothesis that were assumed in the sections 4.1.1 (H1: the size of the audit 
committee are negatively associated with the earning management) and 4.1.4 (H4: 
the meetings of the audit committee are negatively associated with the earning 
management) can be rejected.  
Furthermore, regarding the hypothesis, H2 (the independence of the audit committee 
are negatively associated with the earning management), and H3 (the financial 
experts of the audit committee are negatively associated with the earning 
management), that states, the audit committee independence and audit committee 
financial experts are negative associate with the occurrence of earrings management, 
it can easily highlight that these hypothesis are supported and so they are accepted.  
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5.2.4 Variance Inflated Factor (VIF) 
 
Table 4 Variance Inflated Factor (VIF) 
 
Regarding table 4, it is examined the variance inflated factor (VIF) of the variables. The 
scores vary within limits from 1.01 to 1.22, suggesting that it is not exist here the 
phenomenon of multicollinearity. According to assumption of Hair, J. F., Black, W. C., 
Babin, B. J., Anderson, R. E., & Tatham, R. L. (2006) opined that “multicollinearity is of 
great concern if the VIF value is more than 5”. 
5.2.5 Normality Test 
 
Table 5 Table Normality Test 
 
In the research of Korkmaz, S., Goksuluk, D., & Zararsiz, G. (2015), suggest that if the 
multivariate normality test of Doornik-Hansen the p-value is less than the boundary 
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0.005, then the model has normality. So, as it is observed above, it is verified that in 
this research the model has also normality.  
5.2.6 Heteroscedasticity Test 
 
Table 6 Heteroscedasticity Test 
 
 
As it is presented in the table 6, all the fitted values are gathered close to the line and 
have the same scatter. So, as it observed in the diagram, here exists the phenomenon 
of the homoscedasticity. Because, in this model all the points are not widely varying 
distance from the regression line so it is understand that the model is accurate, (Glen, 
2019). 
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5.2.7 Ramsey RESET Test 
 
Table 7 Misspecification test (Ramsey Reset Test) 
 
Regarding to the table above, it is observed that the Prob > F = 0.0119< 0.05. 
Therefore, we can reject the null hypothesis “No omitted variables”, with a 95% level 
of confidence, which implies that the model has omitted variables.  
Additionally, the Prob > F = 0.0119 > 0.01. 
So, we accept the null hypothesis with a 99% level of confidence that the model in 
this research has omitted variables. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
This research was investigated in order to exam, how audit committee characteristics 
can negatively affect the presence of the earning management in a company. The 
investigation aims at identifying if there is any relationship in the Greek market and 
specifically in Greek listed companies. Relative research exists in other markets, such 
as India, Jordan, Bahrain and Malaysia, while the effects of audit committee 
characteristics on earnings management remains uninvestigated in the Greek market. 
Additionally, it is observed the lack of internal control on company’s corporate 
governance and the lack of communication between the managers and the 
shareholders (agency costs).  
Figure 3 ADC Hypothesis Result 
 
The results of the regression analysis exhibit the positive association among ADC size 
and discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management. So, the hypotheses 1 
about “the audit committee size is negatively associated with earning management” 
is rejected. As a result, a bigger audit team is possible to not be able to verify the 
integrity of reported figures. 
The results present a negative association between the AC financial and accounting 
expertize with earning management. So, the hypotheses 3 about “the audit 
committee expertise is negatively associate with earning management” is accepted.  
For this reason, it is accepted the possibility that, if the members of the internal audit 
have educational and experience background that they are related with the field of 
finance and accounting, then the possibility of detecting material misstatements is 
increased. 
Regarding the AC independence, it is observed that there is a negative relationship 
between the EM and this characteristic and the effect of AC independence to the EM 
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is very strong, less than 5% of significant level. Therefore, the AC independence affects 
significant the EM thus the Audit Committee acts as an external auditor. So, the 
hypotheses 2 about “The audit committee independence is negatively associated with 
earning management” is accepted, with the degree of significant effect to EM to be 
very strong. 
Moreover, it is observed, that AC meetings have a positive association with the EM 
and the degree of significant effect is very weak. Therefore, the frequency of audit 
committee meetings does not affect significant the increase or decrease of EM. So, 
the hypotheses 4 about “The frequency of audit committee meetings is negatively 
associated with earning management” is rejected.  
Regarding to the table 1. Descriptive Statistics, Greek listed companies (28.33%) are 
reviewed by Big-4 auditors. Therefore, most Greek listed companies (71.69%) prefer 
not to be reviewed by Big-4 auditors. Additionally, it is observed the significant effect 
of Big-4 audit companies is very strong to the EM, in our analysis the significant level 
of BIG4 to EM is 5%. 
Finally, it is observed that the ADCIND, LEVG, CredPer and Liq are significant in 
significance level of 5%. Moreover, ADCSIZE and BIG4, are significant in significance 
level of 10%. Additionally, as it is noticed, the variables; ADCMEET, ADCEXP, COSIZE, 
InvPer, CollPer and ROA with their respective p values are high so there are seemed 
to be insignificant in all significance levels. Therefore, the fact that these variables are 
statistically insignificant indicates that they have no effect on the EM (discretionary 
accruals). 
Last but not least, this investigation present to the research community new evidences 
about the association of the internal audit with the possibility of appearance the 
phenomenon of manipulation in the accounting and financial reports. Also, this study 
may give the opportunity to empower new researchers to investigate in other stock 
markets in the European countries. European countries with similar institutional and 
economic system can become new research points since there are still many areas 
that need clarification. 
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